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Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,
51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

160.70

162.62

165.39

141.08

148.63

148.52

196.64

198.49

194.92

82.40

80.39

76.30

89.66

86.46

81.75

164.50

98.50

*

409.86

300.33

304.28

5.86

8.35

8.06

5.96

7.38

7.46

10.99

15.36

13.88

9.95

12.46

12.61

3.20

4.04

3.84

Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .

After the 2012 elections, Congress returned to
Washington, D.C. for a lame-duck session to address the
“fiscal cliff,” the simultaneous challenge of expiring tax
legislation and pending budget sequestration. Somewhere
in this lame-duck agenda the farm bill may also find
attention, as promised during the campaign season.
Finishing a farm bill could produce budget savings that
helps solve part of the fiscal cliff challenge. And perhaps
more urgently, reauthorizing or at least extending nowexpired farm bill legislation would prevent permanent farm
bill legislation from 1949 taking effect on January 1.
While the consideration of farm bill legislation in the
lame-duck session of Congress was yet to happen as this
was written, it was expected that the principal farm bill
proposals as passed in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives Agriculture Committee would form the
basis of any final compromise. The major differences
between the two farm bill proposals were largely
constrained to a price-vs.-revenue debate for the commodity
program, and a question of the size of spending cuts for
food assistance programs. While the food assistance
spending question became the real political sticking point
leading up to the election, the commodity program debate
is of relevance here.
Farm Bill Research

Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
*No Market

155.00

237.50

*

153.50

215.00

*

95.00

190.00

*

232.50

275.00

284.75

74.25

102.50

107.00

On-going research at the University of Nebraska is
focused on an analysis of farm income, policy and risk
management decisions that impact Nebraska producers. The
research model and analysis was initially developed
through grant support of the Nebraska Soybean Board,
while on-going research is currently funded by the
Nebraska Corn Board. The research essentially addresses
the question of price, yield and revenue risk for Nebraska
producers, building on historical price and yield distributions and correlations. Model farms, one for each
agricultural statistics district in the state, provides a
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cooperating with the C ounties and the U .S . D epartm ent of A griculture.
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of the U niversity of N ebrask a–Lincoln and the U nited S tates D epartm ent of A griculture.

representative sample of crop acreage, crop mix, yield
levels and yield variability throughout the state for
analysis. The model includes a representative mix of
wheat, irrigated corn, non-irrigated corn, irrigated
soybeans and non-irrigated soybeans across the state.
Figure 1 shows each
representative farm
and county in each
district across the
state.

down to 75 percent, with a different payment rate.
Alternatively, PLC provides traditional counter-cyclical
income support if season-average market prices drop below
target prices. The proposed target prices are substantially
increased relative to existing target prices in 2008 and
earlier legislation.

Both Senate and
House revenue safety
net proposals only
cover shallow losses
Each analysis is
and presume that
based on a simulation
farmers will purof 500 draws or
chase individual crop
possible outcomes for
insurance as the
each representative
foundation of their
farm based on the
risk management
p r i c e an d yi e l d
plan. Another comdistributions and
ponent of the
correlations. The averproposed safety net
ages and distributions
is a Supplemental
of those 500 draws Figure 1. Nebraska Farm Income and Risk Model Representative Farms
Coverage Option
provide the basis for the
(SCO) that would
following analysis of the alternative commodity program
provide producers the option to purchase a subsidized areaproposals and related crop insurance language, and
based revenue insurance policy on part of their crop
provide a comparison of the House and Senate farm bill
insurance deductible. The availability of this option varies
proposals and impacts for Nebraska producers. Inforbetween the Senate and House versions, but essentially it
mation on the model and simulation is discussed in the
could cover much of the gap of losses that are not covered
Jansen, Stockton and Lubben paper, while earlier research
by either the revenue safety net program or the individual
illustrating the analysis methods and tools is available in
crop insurance purchase.
the Jansen, Lubben and Stockton paper, both of which are
Table 1 (on next page) provides an overview of the
available on the web as listed in the references.
mechanics of each of the farm program options and
establishes the “scenarios” for analysis in the research
Farm Bill Proposals
model. The first scenario is not participating in any
The current farm bill proposals differ primarily in
program or purchasing any insurance to produce a crop
whether they offer an average revenue-based safety net
revenue only result for comparison. The second scenario
(Senate) or an average revenue vs. fixed price-based safety
considers only the purchase of SCO which would be
net (House). Whether the farm bill is completed in the
possible under the Senate proposal if not participating in
lame-duck session of Congress or is pushed off to the new
the ARC program, coupled with Revenue Protection (RP)
year and the new Congress, these basic options and
crop insurance at the 70 percent protection level, the most
differences should frame the decision for producers.
common policy and protection purchased in Nebraska. The
third and fourth scenarios consider the ARC plan from the
In the Senate proposal, the program is called ARC, or
Senate at either the farm or county level. Under these
Agricultural Risk Coverage. It would provide a revenueproposals, ARC pays on losses from 89 to 79 percent of
based safety net based on five-year average yields and
five-year Olympic-average revenue. As a result, SCO is
prices. It is a shallow-loss program that would start paying
only available below 79 percent, down to the 70 percent RP
on losses below 89 percent of the average revenue
policy. Scenario five includes the RLC coverage from 85
benchmark, but would only pay on losses down to 79
percent down to 75 percent of five-year Olympic average
percent of the benchmark. There is a proposed option to
revenue, as proposed in the House. This option specifically
base the coverage on either farm-level revenue or countyexcludes eligibility for SCO, so there is a gap in protection
level revenue. Farm-level protection would be expected to
down to the 70 percent RP coverage. Finally, scenario six
pay more often based on more yield variability at the farm,
considers the PLC option in the House proposal, which
but the payment rate is lower, creating at least some offset.
provides counter-cyclical payments based on a revised
In the House proposal, the choice is between Revenue
target price, as noted in the table. Importantly, this option
Loss Coverage (RLC) or Price Loss Coverage (PLC). RLC
was written in the House proposal as allowing SCO at 90
provides shallow-loss revenue protection similar to the
percent, so the scenario considers SCO from 90 to 70
Senate ARC proposal at the county level, but the trigger
percent and RP at 70 percent.
starts at 85 percent of the benchmark and pays on losses

Table 1. Farm Program Options, Supplemental Crop Insurance and Revenue Protection Scenarios
Commodity Program
Coverage Level

Supplemental
Coverage Option

Crop Insurance

Program
NP-NSCO-NI

No Program

-----

No SCO

No crop insurance

NP-SCO-RP

No Program

-----

SCO (90%-70%)

RP (70%)

ARCF-SCO-RP

ARC-Farm

89%-79% of 5-year average farm revenue

SCO (79%-70%)

RP (70%)

ARCC-SCO-RP

ARC-County

89%-79% of 5-year average county revenue

SCO (79%-70%)

RP (70%)

RLC-NSCO-RP

RLC

85%-75% of 5-year average county revenue

No SCO (not
available

RP (70%)

PLC-SCO-RP

PLC

Counter-cyclical payments below target
prices: Corn = $3.70; Soybeans = $8.40;
W heat = $5.50

SCO (90% - 70%)

RP (70%)

Scenario

Table 2. Average Commodity Program Payments per Acre by Representative Farm
Risk M anagement Scenario
Representative Farm
NP-SCO-RP

ARCF-SCO-RP

ARCC-SCO-RP

RLC-NSCO-RP

PLC-SCO-RP

District 10 Farm

$0.00

$13.32

$0.74

$0.56

$0.00

District 20 Farm

0.00

12.55

0.30

0.22

0.00

District 30 Farm

0.00

20.17

0.01

0.00

0.00

District 50 Farm

0.00

13.03

0.83

0.74

0.00

District 60 Farm

0.00

20.26

0.45

0.32

0.00

District 70 Farm

0.00

10.88

0.77

0.67

0.00

District 80 Farm

0.00

5.96

0.63

0.52

0.00

District 90 Farm

0.00

22.61

1.41

1.18

0.00

Farm Bill Analysis
Using the scenarios and farm program options
described in Table 1, we can analyze economic impacts on
representative Nebraska crop producers. Table 2 provides
a per-acre analysis of the expected commodity program
payments (ARC, RLC or PLC) for 2013, given trend yield
expectations and price expectations as of September 2012.
Based on current price expectations for 2013, the ARC
program at the farm level clearly outperforms every other
commodity program proposal. Not surprisingly, the farmlevel coverage of ARC pays more often and at higher
average levels than ARC or RLC at the county level. PLC
in the last column does not pay at all, indicating that at
current price expectations, we could not simulate any price
drops large enought to trigger counter-cyclical payments
for 2013, even at the proposed higher target prices.
A second important component to consider is the
potential premiums and indemnities from SCO. The
coverage looks particularly attractive, considering the
proposed 70 percent subsidy rates for premiums. The
available coverage also varies between farm program
options, meaning that commodity programs and SCO

really need to be analyzed together to get a true picture of
the potential payments. Table 3 (on next page) provides
that full analysis of expected payments. When analyzing
the combination of commodity program payments and
SCO net payments, the picture becomes much more
mixed. While ARC at the farm makes the largest
commodity program payments (as shown in Table 2), the
availability of SCO is substantially limited under ARC
(and not available at all under RLC). But, if a producer can
and does purchase the maximum SCO coverage (90
percent down to the assumed 70 percent RP coverage) by
not participating in ARC or by choosing the PLC option,
then expected net SCO payments are substantial,
particularly in the Panhandle (District 10). Based on
expectations, ARC at the farm with limited SCO still
appears preferable to the other options for Nebraska
producers, but the availability of SCO is an important
consideration.
Two graphs complete the analysis and discussion of
farm program alternatives. Figure 2 (on next page)
illustrates the probability of commodity program and SCO
payments on the farm in Southwest Nebraska (District 70).
With the inherent yield variability of the region, this repre-

Table 3. Average Commodity Program and Supplemental Coverage Net Payments per Acre by Representative Farm
Risk M anagement Scenario
Representative Farms
NP-SCO-RP

ARCF-SCO-RP

ARCC-SCO-RP

RLC-NSCO-RP

PLC-SCO-RP

District 10 Farm

$16.35

$16.94

$4.36

$0.56

$16.35

District 20 Farm

4.97

13.26

1.01

0.22

4.97

District 30 Farm

1.73

20.28

0.12

0.00

1.73

District 50 Farm

6.45

14.09

1.89

0.74

6.45

District 60 Farm

5.87

21.52

1.71

0.32

5.87

District 70 Farm

6.73

12.09

1.99

0.67

6.73

District 80 Farm

5.30

7.16

1.84

0.52

5.30

District 90 Farm

9.55

25.19

3.99

1.18

9.55

sentative farm shows a good picture of how payments
compare across strategies. The chart is a plot of the
Cumulative Density Function (CDF) for each of the
scenarios in the study. To read the CDF, you read the
number on the left axis as the probability that the actual
payment will be less than or equal to the number on the
bottom axis. For example, the brown line (PLC-SCO-RP)
crosses the $0 line at approximately 0.5, meaning there is
a probability of about 50 percent that this scenario will
result in negative payments (remember there are farmerpaid premiums on SCO). A scenario with a line that is
further to the right in the graph is preferred to the others as
it indicates greater payments and probabilities. Since the
lines cross multiple times, there is not an obvious optimal
scenario in this method of analysis, but is clear that either
the ARC plan at the farm with SCO (ARCF-SCO-RP) or
the PLC plan with SCO (PLC-SCO-RP) provide the
greatest probability and size of expected payments.

Figure 2. Commodity Program Payments and SCO Net Payments on the
District 70 Representative Farm

The graph shown in Figure 3 is a CDF chart of the
total adjusted crop revenue on the farm, including actual
crop revenue, commodity program payments, net SCO

payments and net RP payments. The graph shows the
impact of expected prices for 2013 in terms of expected
revenue on the representative farm in Southwest Nebraska.
The scale of expected crop revenue generally dwarfs the
expected payments from commodity programs and crop
insurance (SCO and RP), except on the low end of
revenue. As compared to the do nothing approach (NPNSCO-NI), all of the scenarios substantially improve the
worst-case outcomes. Buying crop insurance (RP in the
study), buying SCO and participating in the farm program
all improve on the bottom line, with differences of nearly
$400,00 between the worst-case outcome of doing nothing
and the other scenarios of various farm program and
insurance combinations.

Figure 3. Crop Revenue, Commodity Program Payments, SCO Net
Payments and RP Net Payments on the District 70 Representative Farm

The analysis demonstrates the substantial impact that
proposed commodity programs and supplemental crop
insurance could have for producers across the state. The
analysis shows the largest expected payments from the
ARC program at the farm level, although the greater

availability of SCO under the PLC plan can greatly offset
that advantage. And the probability analysis shows some
mixed results between the various scenarios.
It is important to remember again that this is an
analysis of farm program alternatives and expectations for
2013 revenue and payments. At current expected price
levels, the price safety net of PLC never kicks in and the
advantage of an average revenue-based safety net is clear.
But, if price levels were to someday return to lower levels
and remain lower, than the PLC plan could make
substantial payments over several years, even as the
average revenue-based plans eventually offer lower
protection with lower average prices. The optimal program
option for producers is partly a function of producer
expectations for prices over the life of the farm bill. Even
the choice between participating in a commodity program
tied to average revenue (average yields and average prices)
vs. participating in greater purchases of SCO (tied to
current year prices) could vary from year to year, based on
current prices relative to the five-year Olympic average
price.
Farm Bill Outlook
As of late November, expectations were for Congress
to take up the farm bill, likely as part of a broad legislative
effort to address the fiscal cliff. If so, the farm bill could
well contain both a revenue-based and a price-based safety
net in line with the House proposal as a necessary
compromise. If the farm bill is not completed in 2012, a
short extension to push the debate to a new Congress in
2013 will still leave the same basic framework and options
for commodity programs. Thus, the analysis should
provide good guidance for producers on how the programs
could work and how they could offer risk protection in
2013 and beyond. Expected payments look to be smaller
than the direct payments of the past that are essentially
guaranteed to disappear, but the risk protection against
crop revenue losses could be substantially greater and
should merit careful attention and decision-making from
producers.
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